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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
State of Utah 
EDYTH H. WESTERFIELD, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
WILMER T. COOP, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Defendant appeals from the judgment entered in the 
above action wherein the plaintiff w.as awarded judg-
ment against the defendant for $2750.00 for delinquent 
support money, $150.00 for fees for her attorney and 
court costs in the amount of $13.20. In this brief, we 
refer to the partie:S as they appeared in the court below. 
The record on appeal is in two volumes, one of which 
consists of the pleadings, minute entries, and similar 
papers. All references to this volume are designated 
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by the letter "R.'' The other volume which is separately 
numbered is a transcript of the testimony and proceed-
ings at the trial. References to this volume are desig-
nated by the letter "T." 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On September 24, 1942, plaintiff obtained a final 
decree of divorce from the defendant in Sacramento 
County, California. Both parties at the time being resi-
dents of the state of California (R. 1). 
By the terms of the California decree, defendant 
was ordered to pay the sum of $65.00 per month to plain-
tiff for the support and 1naintenance of herself and the 
three minor children of the parties. Thi.s sum was not 
apportioned as to what amount would be for plaintiff 
as alimony and what amount as support n1oney for the 
children. 
On February 21, 1944, plaintiff obtained an order 
1nodifying the divorce decree whereby the previous award 
of support money for herself and the three minor chil-
dren is increased fr01n $65.00 per n1onth to $100.00 per 
month and here also, there is no atte1npt to apportion 
a part of this sum as alimony and a part as support 
money, nor to indicate how much was to be paid for the 
support of each child (R. 1). This order to pay w.as 
limited by the phrase "until the further order of the 
court" (R. 1). 
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Plaintiff re-1narried in April of 1944 and made no 
attempt to establish what amount defendant should pay 
fr01n that tune on as support money (T. 13). Nor did 
plaintiff seek a uwdification of the decree a.s each child 
attained majority (T. 13). 
In April, 1955, plaintiff commenced an action in the 
District court of Weber County, State of Utah for delin-
quent alimony and support money due under the Cali-
fornia decree in the amount of $8400.00. 
The court held that the .statute of limitations had run 
against .all amounts due prior to April 19, 1947, (eight 
years prior to plaintiff's action in Utah) (R. 13) and 
the court further found that although the Californ-ia 
court's decree of divorce does not specifically so state, 
it was said court's intent in said divorce decree (italics 
ours) that the support payments required to be made by 
the defendant to the plaintiff for the plaintiff and the 
minor children's support be divided equally among the 
plaintiff and the children, one-fourth (1).!,) to each, and 
that further, when the plaintiff re-married in April of 
1944, the defendant's duty to pay support payments for 
plaintiff terminated and the support payments should 
have been reduced to Seventy-Five and 00/100 Dollars 
($75.00) per month under the modified decree of divorce~ 
and that when Richard Coop, the eldest child of the 
parties, left the family and took up his own independent 
life in October, 1944 by marrying, the defendant's duty 
to pay support payments for him terminated and the 
support payment should have been further reduced to the 
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sum of Fifty and no/100 Dollars ($50.00) per nwnth, and 
that when Wilmer Coop attained the age of majority on 
October 17, 1950, the defendant's duty to pay support 
for him terminated and the support payments should 
have been reduced to Twenty-Five and 00/100 Dollars 
($25.00) per month, and that when George Coop attained 
his majority on December 2, 1952, the defendant's duty 
to pay future support payntents terminated. The court 
therefore finds that the defendant has failed, refused and 
neglected to pay to the plaintiff as ordered by the Super-
ior Court of the State of California in the parties divorce 
decree for support money, which has not been barred by 
the Statute of Limitations, is as follows: Three (3) 
year.s, six ( 6) months), at Fifty and 00/100 Dollars 
( $50.00) per month as and for the support for the 
minor children of the parties, Wilmer and George Coop, 
being the period of time from April19, 1947 to October 
17, 1950, and for two (2) years and two (2) months at 
Twenty-Five and 00/100 Dollars ($25.00) per month 
for the support of the minor child of the parties, George 
Coop, being the period of time fron1 April 19, 1947 to 
December 2, 1952, the total amount being Two Thousand 
Seven Hundred Fifty and 00/100 Dollars ($2,750.00) no 
part of which has been paid. Plaintiff was .also awarded 
$150.00 as attorneys fees and $13.20 as court costs (R. 13, 
19). 
STATEMENT OF POINT TO BE ARGUED 
POINT I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DISMISS THE 
COMPLAINT FOR THE REASON THAT SAID COMPLAINT 
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FAILED TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION UPON WHICH 
RELIEF COULD BE GRANTED. 
ARGUMENT 
rrhe facts, as related above, show a judgment of di-
vorce awarded in California, which as modified provided 
that defendant pay plaintiff for the support of herself 
and the three minor boys of the parties, the sum of 
$100.00 per month. That said sum was never apportioned 
as to what amount of the total was for alimony and what 
amount for support money for each of the children, 
neither in the decree, the modification nor by any subse-
quent change of circumstances. (Italics ours.) 
No action had been taken in the state of California 
to reduce the decree as modified to a final judgment so 
that the amount due was a fixed, sum certain and it is the 
contention of defendant that the judgment not being a 
final one, wa.s not entitled to the protection of the full 
faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution and an 
action could not be filed in the State of Utah until such 
action had been taken. 
The Restatement of the Conflict of Laws, Section 
434, page 517, provides that in order for a valid foreign 
judgment to be enforced by an action in another state, 
it must be, among other things,_( a) final and (b) certain 
in amount. 
In support of defendant contention that the Cali-
fornia decree was not final so as to entitle it to full 
faith ,and credit in Utah, defendant refers the court to 
the only Utah case on this point, Hunt vs. Monroe, 91 P. 
269. 
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In that case a decree of divorce was .awarded in the 
state of Colorado ; custody of the two minor children was 
awarded to the mother and the father was ordered to 
pay a total of $20.00 per month for the support of the 
two minors. A total sum of $60.00 w.as paid in compli-
ance with the said decree during a four and a half year 
period. Suit was filed in the Utah court for the delin-
quent support money due under the Colorado decree. 
On the issue as to whether a decree and judgment 
of a sister state for .accumulated alimony or maintenance 
money was a final judgment which was entitled to full 
faith and credit in an action in Utah, our Supreme Court 
held: 
"The question as we understand it, in view 
of the decision in the Lynde case, (Lynde vs. 
Lynde, 181 U.S. 183) may be stated thus: that an 
action upon a judgment or decree for alimony or 
maintenance, rendered by a court of competent 
jurisdiction of one state, may be maintained in 
another court of c01npetent jurisdiction of another 
state, where the amount due or payable is fixed, 
having a definite sum presently due and en force-
able in the state where rendered; but that alimony 
or maintenance becoming due in the future, pay-
able in installments is not a final judgment upon 
which an action can be brought, unless and until 
the court which rendered it passes upm1 and fixes 
the specific amount due and payable in some 
proper proceedings in the original action, if sucl1 
can be maintained in the state where the original 
order or judgment was entered. The n1ere fact, 
however, that .a specific. sun1, presently due, is 
also subject •to 1nodification, does not defeat the 
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action in any other state; but the fact that a sum 
is not specifically fixed as due in the future and 
payable in installments or otherwise, does defeat 
the right of action, unless the amount due is as-
certained and fixed by some appropriate proceed-
ings before the action on the judgment or order or 
decree is commenced as above stated. In view, 
therefore, that the judgment or decree in this 
case f.alls clearly within that class which in the 
Lynde case is held not to be a final judgment and 
hence not within the full faith and credit clause 
of the Federal Constitution, we have no alterna-
tive than to hold that the action cannot be main-
tained on the judgment as it now stands." (Italics 
ours.) 
Prior to instituting the action in the Utah court, 
the plaintiff in the instant case, made no effort to have 
the judgment for alilnony .and support reduced to a 
fixed, sum certain and therefore, in accordance with the 
holding in Hunt v. Monroe, supra, the judgment suerl 
on was not a final judgment and was not entitled to full 
faith and credit under the Federal Constitution. 
In the case of Kahn vs. Kahn, 268 P2 151, (Cal.), the 
plaintiff sued the defendant in the California courts on 
a judgment for alimony and support obtained in a di-
vorce proceeding in Ohio. The decree in the Ohio court 
provided for alimony and support money in a combined 
sum as follows : "It is ordered that the plaintiff is here-
by allowed as reasonable alimony for herself and the 
support of her three minor children, and the defendant 
is ordered to pay to the plaintiff the sum of $300.00 per 
month, each and every month until the further order of 
the court. " (Italics ours.) 
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The California court held as follows: 
"Also since the Ohio court reserved continu-
ing jurisdiction over ~the subject of alimony and 
child support, appellant does not possess the abso-
ute right to recover in a collateral proceeding in 
another court. Before she can make any headway 
toward realizing on her judgment, she must re-
quest the court that dissolved her marriage to 
modify the decree by entering a judgment for the 
accrued sums. (Italics ours.) (Citing case.s.) In 
each of the cited cases the order to pay was limit-
ed, as in the instant judgment, by the phrase 'until 
the further order of this court.' By reason of the 
fact that in the judgment here involved, the Ohio 
court expressly reserved a continuing jurisdic-
tion over the subject matter, appellant can state 
no cause of action until she has requested the 
Ohio court to modify its decree by adjudging a 
definite lump sum to be due. Having failed to do 
so, her complaint states no valid cause of action. 
(Italics our.s.) 
Thus it is seen that the California Courts have 
agreed with the Utah Court. In the case at bar, the court 
of the State of California had also retained continuing 
jurisdiction over the matter by the phrase "until the 
further order of this court" and thus prevented the judg-
ment from being final and certain and in the absence of 
the plaintiff applying to the California court for a judg-
ment for accrued sums, her complaint does not state a 
cause of action. 
Plaintiff could not haYe recovered the arrearages 
in an action brought in California because Section 336 of 
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the California Code of Civil Procedure bars an action 
of any state if brought 1nore than five years after it:; 
entry. 
In Kahn u. Kahn, supra, the court stated: 
"Because no installment payable within such 
last preceding five years, and because all had ma-
tured more than five years before the instant suit 
was filed, not one of the three children can suc-
cessfully assert a right under the Ohio decree, even 
if the entire judgment had run in their favor 
only." 
In support of this proposition, the court cited Cali-
fornia authorities, Biewend vs. Biewend, 109 P2 701, 
Castle vs. Castle, 162 P2 656. 
Therefore, in the present 0ase where plaintiff re-
married in 1944, the son Richard married in 1944, and 
son Wilmer became 21 years of age in 1950, and son 
George became 21 years of age in 1952, no action could 
be maintained for plaintiff, and sons Richard and Wil-
mer in the State of California, because of the 5 year 
statute of limitations, even if the decree had been modi-
fied and the sums due them had been made certain. 
This leaves only son George to be considered and it is not 
for the Utah court to say what is due to him from tlv~ 
non-apportioned award of alimony and support money. 
To deternline that would be to indulge in speculation and 
guess. 
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If this judgment is void and unenforceable as to 
plaintiff and two of the three children in California be-
cause of the California St~atute of Limitation, can the 
judgment be a valid one in Utah~ A judgment that 1s 
void and unenforceable in California cannot be entitled 
to full faith and credit in Utah. Restatement of Conflic~ 
of Laws, Sec. 441, page 523. 
"A valid foreign judgment for the payment 
of money will be enforced only for the amount 
for which it is enforceable in the state in which 
it was rendered." 
Another reason why the complaint does not state a 
oo.use of action is that the decree of the California court 
is not entitled to full faith and credit because of the un-
certainty in the amount due on the judgment. 
To emphasize the uncertainty, plaintiff in her com-
plaint prayed for $8400.00; at the trial, plaintiff amend-
ed to ask judgment for $12,500.00 and the trial court 
below awarded the sum of $2,750.00. 
It is to be re1ne1nbered that ~the California decree 
provided for an award that \Yas non-apportioned as to 
alimony and .support money. 
The trial court below under these facts has attempt-
ed to do so1nething in regard to a California decree that 
no California court would do. That is to retro-actively 
1nodify the decree when ehanges occurred such as re-
Inarriage of the plaintiff and the cmning of age and 
marriage of the minors. 
10 
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In the Findings of Fact in the instant case (R. 13) 
and paragraph 9 thereof, the court below stated "The 
eourt further finds that although the California courts' 
decree does not specifically so state, it was s.aid court's 
intent in said divorce decree that the support payments 
required to be made by the defendant to the plaintiff for 
the plaintiff and the minor children's support be divided 
equally among the plaintiff and the children, one-fourth 
(1_4) to e.ach, etc." What right does the Utah court have 
to say under these circumstances what the intent of the 
California court was~ 
It is the indisputable law in California that where a 
blanket award h.as been made for alimony and support 
money, without an attempt to apportion between them, 
and the wife remarries or a minor comes of age that the 
judgment is unenforceable in the absence of a modifica-
tion of the decree to make the amount due certain. Da11z 
us. Danz, 216 P2 162, Kahn v. Kahn, 268 P2 151, Parker 
v. Parker, 266 P. 283. 
In Parker v. Parker, ( C.al.) 266 P. 283, an order such 
as was made in the instant case reducing a blanket award 
for alimony and support money without a petition to 
modify the decree being made and gr.anted was reversed, 
because "*** it was in effect a retro-active modification 
of the judgment." 
The California court in the Parker case did not feel 
that it was within the province of either the Supren1e 
Court or the trial court to determine retro-actively what 
11 
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portion of the entire .a1nount was alimony and what por-
tion was support money and to do so was to indulge in 
speculation and guess. 
In Danz v. Danz , (Cal.) 216 P2 162, where the wife 
had been given ·a combined or blanket award for alimony 
and support money, had subsequently remarried and had 
never obtained a modification of the decree, the trial 
court refused to order defendant to pay alimony or sup-
port money after the marriage of the plaintiff in the 
absence of a modification of the decree. The Supreme 
Court of California upheld this action stating that the 
trial court could not at the time if acted, modify the 
blanket order. 
In Kahn v. Kahn, (Cal.) 268 P2151 wherein an action 
was filed in California on an Ohio decree awarding a 
non-apportioned sum as alimony and support money, the 
California court held that inas1nuch as it was impossible 
to determine what amount was meant for alimony and 
what amount was me!ant .as support money, that the 
judgment was therefore too uncertain to be enforc-eable 
and the pleadings consequently did not state a cause of 
action, and were not entiHed to full faith and credit. 
Further quoting fr01u Kahn vs. Kahn, supra, 
"From a review of the pertinent decisions it 
is clearly the e.stablished law that if a wife seek~ 
to recover the unpaid installments on her decree 
from another court and the amount of her award 
is the combined su1n of ·alilnony and support and 
12 
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her children have attained their majorities and 
the court is unable to determine the portion in-
tended for alimony as distinguished from the part 
allowed for child support, then the entire award 
of such decree is illegal and non-enforceable. Hale 
vs. Hale (Cal.) 45 P2 266." 
See also : Danz v. Danz, (Cal.) 216 P2 162; Harris v. 
Harris, (Cal.) 52 P2 985; McVey v. McVey, (Ariz.) 137 
P2 971, 972; Levy v. Dockendorff, (N.Y.) 163 N.Y.S. 435, 
439; Parker v. Parker, (Cal.) 266 P. 283; Schl1tter v. 
Schluter, (Cal.) 20 P2 723; McKannay v. McKannay, 
(Cal.) 230 P2 214; Herman v. Brennan, 211 N.W. 52 
(Mich.); Boehler v. Boehler, 125 Wise. 627, 104 N.W. 
840, 841; Rife v. Rife, 272 ill. App. 404, 411; Evans v. 
Evans, 116 Wash. 460, 199 P. 764. 
It is quite clear, therefore, that where plaintiff had 
remarried and the minors have attained their majorities, 
the California Court would not have entertained plain-
tiff's aetion on the decree for a combined sum as alimony 
and support money, until and unless the decree had been 
modified after the re-Inarriage of plaintiff and the com-
ing of age of the boys and there had been a judicial deter-
mination ,that .a fixed, sum certain was due. 
Applying the California law to the California decree, 
plaintiff was not entitled to recover without a modifica-
tion of the decree and an adjudication that a sum certain 
was due and the Utah court was required to follow the 
California law in this matter. 
13 
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If the ~urn due was not certain so that .a complaint, 
if filed in California would not state a cause of action, 
the judgment would not be sufficiently certain to be en. 
titled to full faith and credit in the state of Utah. 
Restatement of Conflict of Law, Sec. 436, page 519: 
"A valid foreign judgment for the payment of 
money will not be enforced uness the amount to be 
paid is fixed in the judgment, or has since become 
fixed under the law of the state which rendered it. 
(Italics our.s.) 
CONCLUSION 
The complaint of the plaintiff filed in the District 
Court of Weber County, Utah on a California divorce 
decree did not state a cause of action because any claim 
plaintiff had against the defendant was void and un-
enforceable because of the California Statute of Limita-
tions and because the foreign judgment sued on was not 
entitled to full faith and credit in Utah because the 
judgment was not final and was not certain. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GEORGE B. HANDY 
Attorney for Defendant and 
AppeUant 
14 
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